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Preschool for All: Plyler V. Doe in The Context of 
Early Childhood Education 
Shiva Kooragayala  
ABSTRACT 
In its 1982 opinion in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that a state could not 
deny undocumented children living within its borders a public and free K-12 education. 
This Note argues that Plyler’s protections extend to publicly-funded early childhood 
education programs that serve children between the ages of three and five. Due to the 
broad support of researchers, educators, and the general public, early childhood education 
programs funded by local, state, and the federal governments have become an integral part 
of a comprehensive public education today. While these early childhood education 
programs are nominally open to all students who meet program-specific age, income, and 
geographic residency requirements, undocumented children and children of 
undocumented parents face a variety of indirect and direct barriers to entry that range 
from onerous and arbitrary identification requirements to attempted outright bans on 
enrollment based on immigration status. Taking a prophylactic approach, this Note details 
how denying access to public early childhood education programs to these young children 
contradicts the spirit and central holding of Plyler. In this era of judicial restraint and 
heightened xenophobia, the enduring precedent of Plyler offers an avenue for families, 
policymakers, and advocates to ensure that all children, regardless of their immigration 
status, can receive a comprehensive public education that includes early childhood 
education.   
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“The expedience of this state’s policy may have been influenced by two 
actualities: children of illegal aliens had never been explicitly afforded any 
judicial protection, and little political uproar was likely to be raised in their 
behalf.”—Doe v. Plyler1 
INTRODUCTION 
 After the Supreme Court’s 1982 ruling in Plyler v. Doe, undocumented students 
were finally permitted to attend public primary and secondary schools.2 In the case, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute that empowered school districts to deny 
admission to undocumented students under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.3 By doing so, the Supreme Court ensured that an entire cohort of children 
would not be deprived of basic literacy and a public school education.4   
In consideration of the Supreme Court’s ruling, this Note asserts that Plyler’s 
protections also extend to publicly funded early childhood education programs that serve 
children between the ages of three and five.5 Today, early childhood education is an integral 
component of a comprehensive public education, and as such, public early childhood 
education falls within the gambit of Plyler’s protection.6 The federal government as well 
as many states and municipalities offer their own forms of public early childhood education 
programs7 that are nominally open to all students who meet the respective age, income, 
and geographic state residency requirements.8 Enrolling in these programs can be 
incredibly beneficial for young children—social scientists have demonstrated that early 
childhood education has positive effects on cognitive development, school readiness,9 and 
academic achievement.10 However, not all children stand to benefit from these public 
programs. Undocumented children and children of undocumented parents face a variety of 
 
1 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 589 (E.D. Tex. 1978). 
2 457 U.S. 202 (1982). This Note uses the terms “primary and secondary” to refer to kindergarten to twelfth 
grade. See generally MICHAEL OLIVAS, NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYLER V. DOE AND THE 
EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOLCHILDREN (2012).   
3 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 569; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
4 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 202.  
5 This paper uses the terms “preschool,” “pre-K,” and “early education programs” interchangeably, 
following popular parlance. While programs can vary significantly between jurisdiction, these programs are 
generally voluntary, free, public, and intended for students between the ages of three and four.   
6 See infra Part III.  
7 CHRISTINE JOHNSON-STAUB, EQUITY STARTS EARLY: ADDRESSING RACIAL INEQUITIES IN CHILD CARE 
AND EARLY EDUCATION POLICY 4 (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2017/12/2017_EquityStartsEarly_0.pdf.  
8 State and federal programs vary on the age thresholds. See generally State of Preschool Yearbook: 2018, 
NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH (2018), http://nieer.org/state-preschool-yearbooks/2018-2. 
9 The U.S. Department of Education identifies five “domains” of school readiness: language and literacy 
development, cognition and general knowledge, approaches to learning, physical well-being and motor 
development, and social and emotional development. See Race To the Top – Early Learning Challenge 
Program: Definitions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.ed.gov/early-learning/elc-draft-
summary/definitions. See also Kevin Woodson, Why Kindergarten Is Too Late: The Need for Early 
Childhood Remedies in School Finance Litigation, 70 ARK. L. REV. 87, 97 (2017).  
10 See Julia Isaacs, Impacts of Early Childhood Programs, BROOKINGS INST. 4−6 (2008), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/09_early_programs_isaacs.pdf.   
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barriers to enrollment that keep these short- and long-term benefits of early childhood 
education out of their reach.11  
Some of these public state and local programs ask parents to provide social security 
numbers and state-issued birth certificates when trying to enroll their, while others have 
attempted to prohibit undocumented children altogether on the basis of their immigration 
status.12 Pervasive and deep-seeded hostility towards immigrants, the threats of adverse 
immigration action associated with the receipt of public benefits, reports of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) activity around preschools, and uncertainty about the 
scope of immigrant rights all deter undocumented parents from enrolling their children in 
these public early childhood education programs.13  
The enduring precedent of Plyler offers important protection for the millions of 
undocumented families living in the United States today. It provides an important avenue 
for challenging these enrollment barriers that uniquely impact undocumented children and 
children of undocumented parents. It enables courts to protect the ability of these children 
to avail themselves to a comprehensive public education—an education that includes early 
education. While the Supreme Court was silent on the question of whether undocumented 
children would be able to attend public early childhood education programs, its silence 
merely reflects the relative paucity of these programs in 1982, when it issued its opinion in 
the Plyler case.14 Moreover, Plyler allows the courts to circumvent the more 
constitutionally difficult and controversial issues of recognizing a substantive “right to 
education” or interfering with immigration reform efforts.   
Part I of this Note outlines the growth and embrace of public early childhood 
education by federal, state, and local governments and describes the barriers to entry that 
face undocumented children today. Part II lays the foundation for the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Plyler and explains how the case remains relevant and potentially powerful in 
future litigation. Part III argues that denying access to public early childhood education, 
either directly or indirectly, to these young children contradicts the spirit and central 
holding of Plyler. Taking a prophylactic approach, Part IV describes how advocates, 
parents, and policymakers may use the broader interpretation of Plyler articulated in this 
Note to challenge and prevent future attempts to bar children from accessing public early 
education programs solely because of their immigration status. 
 
11 See Julia Gelatt et al., Supporting Immigrant Families’ Access to Prekindergarten, URB. INST.ITUTE, 
16−17 (2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22286/413026-Supporting-Immigrant-
Families-Access-to-Prekindergarten.PDF. 
12  Id. Christina Samuels, Indiana’s Pre-K Pilot Caught Up in Immigration Debate, EDUC. WK. (Sept. 8, 
2015), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/09/09/indianas-pre-k-pilot-caught-up-in-
immigration.html?print=1. See also Wendy Cervantes et al., CTR. FOR LAW.  & SOC. POLICY, Our 
Children’s Fear: Immigration Policy’s Effects on Young Children 13 (2018), 
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018/03/2018_ourchildrensfears.pdf. 
13 See JOHN W. BORKOWSKI, NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N & NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, LEGAL ISSUES FOR SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS RELATED TO THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN 11 (Lisa E. Soronen ed., 2009), 
https://cdn-files.nsba.org/s3fs-public/reports/Undocumented-
Children.pdf?z7FPI9ZVydzCAmZq1GgB_mDWu9Z.jIvX.   
14 See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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I. THE PROMISE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION 
A. History of Public Early Childhood Education  
Since the 1960s, educators, policymakers, and the general public have increasingly 
embraced and invested in public early childhood education in the United States.15  
The federal government was first to develop public early childhood education 
programming in the United States when, in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson launched 
the federal Head Start Program (“Head Start”) within his “War on Poverty” to “help break 
the cycle of poverty by providing preschool children of low-income families with a 
comprehensive program to meet their emotional, social, health, nutritional, and 
psychological needs.”16 The initial motivation for public investments in early childhood 
education through Head Start centered on closing racial and economic achievement gaps 
as well as breaking the cycle of entrenched poverty in the country.17  
These early investments in public early childhood education were partially a result 
of the rising need for childcare outside the home after World War II. The war brought about 
a widespread entry of women into the formal labor force outside the home.18 Before this 
shift in the household structure, albeit a generalization, one parent typically functioned as 
a wage-earner while the other provided childcare and early education inside the home.19 
As more households began to have two wage-earning parents, the need for childcare and 
early childhood education outside of the home grew. While some families, both then and 
now, rely on familial or other social networks or are able to pay for private early childhood 
 
15 Between 2003 and 2015, state governments increased investments in early education programs by more 
than 200 percent. DEP’T OF EDUC., A MATTER OF EQUITY: PRESCHOOL IN AMERICA 5 (2015), 
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/early-learning/matter-equity-preschool-america.pdf. See generally Sonya 
Michel, The History of Child Care in the U.S., VCU LIBR. SOC. WELFARE HIST. PROJECT, 
https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/programs/child-care-the-american-history/.  
16 From its inception, Head Start has served three and four-year-old students. GA. DEP’T OF EARLY CARE & 
LEARNING, History of Head Start,  http://www.decal.ga.gov/HeadStart/History.aspx (last visited July 10, 
2019). See also COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., PROJECT HEAD START: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS 2 
(1975), https://www.gao.gov/assets/120/115310.pdf [hereinafter PROJECT HEAD START REPORT]; EDWARD 
ZIGLER ET AL., A VISION FOR UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL EDUCATION 2−5 (2006) 
17 See BARBARA BEATTY, PRESCHOOL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: THE CULTURE OF YOUNG CHILDREN FROM 
THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE PRESENT 52−132 (1995). 
18 Craig T. Ramey & Sharon Landesman Ramey, Reframing Early Childhood Education: A Means to 
Public Understanding and Support, in THE CURRENT STATE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE ON PRE-
KINDERGARTEN EFFECTS 93 (Deborah A. Phillips et al. eds., 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/duke_prekstudy_final_4-4-17_hires.pdf; James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to 
Preschool, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 51 (2006); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012–2016 AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES: TABLE S2301 (2018), 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_17_5YR_S2301&
prodType=table (last accessed Nov. 2019) (In 2018, 72.2 percent of women between the ages of 20 and 64 
participated in the labor force).  
19 See EMILY D. CAHAN, PAST CARING: A HISTORY OF U.S. PRESCHOOL CARE AND EDUCATION FOR THE 
POOR, 1820−1965, 30−32 (1989), https://www.researchconnections.org/childcare/resources/2088/pdf. The 
percentage of women working for pay has steadily increased; in 2017, 69.6 percent of married mothers 
worked for pay. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table F-14. Work Experience of Husband and Wife–All Married-
Couple Families, by Presence of Children Under 18 Years Old and Median and Mean Income: 1976 to 
2017, http://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-families.html 
(last accessed Sept. 2019).  
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education or childcare,20 these options are neither practicable nor affordable for a large 
share of American families, and particularly for low-income families.21 This is where Head 
Start fits in. In 2019, “Head Start provides grants to local public and private non-profit and 
for-profit agencies to provide comprehensive child development services to economically 
disadvantaged children and families, with a special focus on helping preschoolers develop 
the skills they need to be successful in school.”22 The program enrolled almost one million 
students in 201723 and provided services to approximately eight percent of children ages 
three to five24 through a summer school program as well as through programming during 
the school year.25 Congress added the Migrant and Seasonal Head Start program in 1969 
to serve children of migrant farm workers and Early Head Start in 1994 to serve children 
under the age of three.26  
Unlike in the case of K-12 education, where the impetus for publicly funded 
education came from state governments, the federal government drove the push for public 
early childhood education,27 partially due to a consensus amongst researchers that 
investments in early childhood education are worthwhile.28 Social science evidence 
indicates that early childhood education critically influences a student’s school readiness.29 
School readiness skills, such as self-regulation, can predict longer-term academic 
achievement in reading and math.30 Students who receive a high-quality education prior to 
entering Kindergarten are also more likely to experience tremendous gains in cognitive 
development, which refers to the ability to build working memories, and cognitive 
 
20 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A MATTER OF EQUITY: PRESCHOOL IN AMERICA 1 (Apr. 2015),  
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/early-learning/matter-equity-preschool-america.pdf. 
21 See Press Release, Rafael Medina, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, New Interactive Reveals the True Cost of 
Quality Early Childhood in Each U.S. State (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release/2018/02/14/446590/release-new-interactive-reveals-true-
cost-quality-early-childhood-education-u-s-state/ (follow interactive “Where Does Your Child Care Dollar 
Go?” hyperlink; then select “Illinois” for state field and select “Preschool” for child’s age field) (estimating 
that the monthly cost of high-quality preschool in Illinois is around $822 a month in 2018).  
22  Head Start Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,704, 57,704 (proposed Sept. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 1307) available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/09/22/2010-23583/head-start-
program. See also Sheila B. Kamerman & Shirley Gatenio-Gabel, Early Childhood Education and Care in 
the United States: An Overview of the Current Policy Picture, 1 INT’L J. CHILD CARE & EDUC. POL’Y 23, 
31 (2007), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/2288-6729-1-1-23. 
23 Kamerman & Gatenio-Gabel, supra note 22, at 31.  
24 Id.  
25 DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Head Start Federal Funding and Funded Enrollment History (2017), 
https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/hs-federal-funding-enrollment-history.pdf.   
26 HEAD START TIMELINE, https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/about-us/article/head-start-timeline (last updated 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
27 Kamerman & Gatenio-Gabel, supra note 22, at 2.  
28 PROJECT HEAD START REPORT, supra note 16, at i (there is a “consensus . . . that Head Start participants 
are better prepared to enter local schools than their disadvantaged, non-participating peers.”). However, 
studies showed that the educational gains children experienced after participating in Head Start 
programming waned after they transitioned to elementary school, raising prospects that continued 
investments in early and primary education might offset such losses. Id. at 5 (asserting that “[the] loss of 
early gains may be attributable to intervening factors over which Head Start has no control”). 
29  See Woodson, supra note 9, at 97 (showing that school readiness encompasses various non-academic 
qualities such as social and emotional development, physical well-being, and language development).  
30 Id. at 103.  
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flexibility.31 Quality early childhood education programs can also nurture childhood 
development, working against any adverse childhood experiences that children may 
experience in their first years of life.32 Furthermore, the research shows that at least in the 
short-term, high quality early childhood education closes disparities in academic 
performance and reduces socioeconomic and racial disparities in literacy and learning.33  
The benefits associated with early childhood education are particularly salient for 
children of immigrants and English-language learners.34 Participation in early childhood 
education programs eases integration for children of immigrants and can help these 
children gain English language skills at a critical age.35 Finally, a copious amount of 
 
31 See Adele Diamond et al., Preschool Program Improves Cognitive Control, 318 SCI. 1387, 1387 (2007) 
(referring to a set of non-academic skills that are “more strongly associated with school readiness than are 
intelligence quotient (IQ) or entry-level reading or math skills.”); Rhoshel K. Lenroot & Jay N. Giedd, 
Brain Development in Children and Adolescents: Insights from Anatomical Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 
30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIO-BEHAVIORAL REV. 718, 720 (2006) (showing that by age five, the human brain 
grows to ninety percent of its adult weight). See generally Deborah A. Phillips et al., The Current State of 
Scientific Knowledge on Pre-Kindergarten Effects, BROOKINGS INST. 19 (2017). 
32 See Deborah A. Phillips et al., Puzzling It Out: The Current State of Scientific Knowledge on Pre-
Kindergarten Effects, in THE CURRENT STATE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE ON PRE-KINDERGARTEN 
EFFECTS, supra note 31, at 25–27; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE RESEARCH BRIEF: 
THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF LARGE PUBLIC EARLY CARE AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS 1–2 
(2014), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/180301/rb_longTermImpact.pdf. 
33 Mark Lipsey et al., Evaluation of the Tennessee Voluntary Prekindergarten Program: End of Pre-K 
Results from the Randomized Control Design (Research Report), VAND. U. PEABODY RES. INST. 10 (2013) 
(showing that students who participated in Tennessee’s pre-K program scored approximately one-third of a 
standard deviation higher on cognitive tests than students who did not enroll). See Jens Ludwig & Deborah 
A. Phillips, Long-term Effects of Head Start on Low-income Children, 1136 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI., 257, 
268 (2008); Allison Friedman-Krauss et al., How Much Can High-Quality Universal Pre-K Reduce 
Achievement Gaps?, CTR. FOR AMER. PROGRESS (Apr. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/early-childhood/reports/2016/04/05/132750/how-much-can-high-
quality-universal-pre-k-reduce-achievement-gaps/; see also William T. Gormley, Jr. & Ted Gayer, 
Promoting School Readiness in Oklahoma: An Evaluation of Tulsa’s Pre-K Program, 40 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 533 (2005) (A study on Tulsa, Oklahoma’s universal prekindergarten program showed 
improvements in reading, writing and math skills that accrued in a matter of a few months). 
34 See Gellatt et al., supra note 11, at 8 (a quasi-experimental evaluation of Oklahoma’s prekindergarten 
program found that gains in math skills were larger for children with parents born in Mexico and for 
children where Spanish is the primary language spoken at home than for children whose parents were born 
in the United States. Evidence from Georgia’s prekindergarten program shows that children with lower 
English proficiency had larger increases in language, literacy, and math test scores, whether measured in 
Spanish or in English, and that children with lower English proficiency made greater gains in measured 
general knowledge than did other students. Finally, in Nebraska, English Language Learners in 
prekindergarten showed a larger increase in knowledge and skills between the fall and the spring than did 
other children).  
35 See Phillips et al., supra note 31, at 22 (“Research to date finds that pre-k enrollment can enable these 
children to make progress in English language proficiency and in their academic skills, each of which likely 
supports growth in the other. As a result, DLLs can experience especially rapid growth in early learning 
when exposed to supportive and rich learning opportunities in pre-k.”). Findings on the longer-term 
benefits of early childhood education are more varied. Phillips et al. write that “the available evidence 
about the long-term effects of state pre-k programs offers some promising potential but is not yet sufficient 
to support confident overall and general conclusions about long-term effects.” Id. at 47.   
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research indicates that investments in early childhood education can be valuable for long-
term macroeconomic goals in addition to these other more individualized benefits.36  
In part due to the strength of this collection of research, state and local actors began 
to play a larger role in funding public early childhood education programs. Currently, forty-
three states offer some form of early childhood education, and numerous cities have begun 
to offer their own versions as well.37 In five states and the District of Columbia, more than 
seventy percent of four year old children enrolled in public early childhood education 
programs during the 2016-2017 school year.38 The District of Columbia enrolled eighty-
eight percent of four year olds, Florida enrolled seventy-seven percent of four year olds, 
and Vermont enrolled seventy-five percent of four year olds during the 2016-2017 school 
year.39 In 2017, as a whole, state programs served approximately five percent of three year 
olds and thirty-three percent of four year old children who were enrolled in public early 
childhood education programs.40   
Many states and municipalities have followed the federal model and target children 
based on a variety of factors including income, parental education, and English as a second 
language.41 State and local programs vary on whether they are open to three year olds in 
addition to four year olds, whether they offer full-day or part-day programming, and 
whether they are run directly by the government or by contracted providers.42  Because 
there are no mandates dictating the quality or scope of these programs from the federal 
government, apart from Head Start, states and municipalities vary on how much they 
expend per pupil.43 Nevertheless, some states like Oklahoma, Florida and Georgia, as well 
as many municipalities, have increasingly rallied around “universal” early childhood 
education programs that serve all children regardless of a family’s income or a child’s 
ability.44 
 
36 Robert Lynch & Kavya Vaghul, The Benefits and Costs of Investing in Early Childhood Education: The 
Fiscal, Economic, and Societal Gains of a Universal Prekindergarten Program in the United States, 2016-
2050, WASHINGTON CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Dec. 2015); see generally Byron G. Aguste et al., The 
Economic Cost of the U.S. Education Gap, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2009), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/our-insights/the-economic-cost-of-the-us-education-
gap. 
37 See generally Pre-K in American Cities, NIEER, http://nieer.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Pre-K-
Report-Final.pdf. 
38 Friedman-Krauss et al., supra note 33, at 24.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 14.  
41 Id. at 7.  
42 See ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 7. 
43 See Friedman-Krauss et al., supra note 33, at 6−12.   
44 Id. at 7−8. See About Voluntary Prekindergarten, FLA. OFF. OF EARLY LEARNING, 
http://www.floridaearlylearning.com/vpk/floridas-vpk-program (last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (Florida’s 
“Voluntary Prekindergarten Education Program” serves “nearly 80 percent” of 4-year-olds in the state, with 
the goal of meeting all need); Kate Taylor, New York City Will Offer Free Preschool for All 3-Year-Olds, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/nyregion/de-blasio-pre-k-
expansion.html (“Implementing the universal prekindergarten program for 4-year-olds was the centerpiece 
of Mr. de Blasio’s campaign for mayor four years ago and is considered to be one of the biggest 
accomplishments of his first term. So it is not surprising that, with his re-election effort starting, he is 
seeking to amplify the achievement.”); see also John Byrne, Emanuel Calls for Free Full-Day Public 
Preschool for 4-Year-Olds, CHI. TRIB. (May 30, 2018), 
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This Note does recognize that early childhood education is different than primary 
and secondary education. Because children are not required to enroll in these programs, 
enrollment in public education programs will likely neither reach 100 percent nor will 
achieve the rate of enrollment in public K-12 schools. However, this voluntariness of 
enrolling in early childhood education does not affect the central question nor the thesis 
purported by this Note.  The question driving this Note pertains to whether students can 
equally access public early childhood education programs. As programs expand and more 
children enroll in public early childhood education, those who are unable to enroll will be 
increasingly disadvantaged. The consequences of exclusion from public early childhood 
education on student achievement and other educational outcomes will grow more severe 
with time.  
The following subpart identifies how undocumented children and children of 
undocumented parents, in particular, face a variety of barriers to access that limit their 
enrollment in these programs.  
B. Immigration Status as a Barrier to Entry 
Notwithstanding increased popular and governmental support for early childhood 
education,45 at least some parents lacking legal documentation face barriers when 
attempting to enroll their children in public early childhood education programs—barriers 
that are connected solely to their immigration status.46 The type and severity of these 
barriers vary state to state and program to program. Examples of barriers, both direct and 
indirect, are described below. 
1. Direct Barriers to Enrollment: The Example of Indiana’s “On My Way Pre-K” Pilot 
Program 
In 2015, the State of Indiana attempted to bar undocumented children from enrolling 
in its pilot universal preschool program for four-year old kids.47 Indiana’s pilot program 
garnered tremendous media pushback and elicited strong reactions from advocates and 
policy makers. 48 In response to the proposed pilot program, Former Secretary of Education 
Arne Duncan stated:  
“Nothing in federal law requires state or local preschool programs to 
exclude any child from participation on the basis of their immigration status, 




45 See supra Part I(A).   
46 See generally Hannah Matthews et al., Immigration Policy’s Harmful Impacts on Early Care and 
Education, CLASP (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018/03/2018_harmfulimpactsece.pdf. 
47 Samuels, supra note 12.    
48 Press Release, Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Statement from U.S. Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan on Indiana Denying Preschool to Undocumented Children (Aug. 14, 2015), 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-secretary-education-arne-duncan-indiana-denying-
preschool-undocumented-children.   
49 Id.   
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The former Secretary’s argument illustrates an important point: Indiana’s attempt to 
restrict access to these children reflected more of an ideological choice rather than 
compliance with any federal or state mandate to do so. The decision was an explicit and 
intentional classification based on immigration status. While Indiana’s pilot program 
exemplifies a rather rare and extreme case of exclusion, it illustrates much of the motivation 
for this paper and underscores the need for adequate protections for this group of children.  
There is no indication that these sorts of attempts to bar children from enrolling in 
public early childhood education programs will disappear with time. In fact, the opposite 
seems to be true: given heightened xenophobia and anti-immigrant policy making at every 
level of government, city, state or federal policy makers may try and erect these kinds of 
direct barriers to access in the future.  
2. Indirect Barriers to Access 
Far more prevalent than policies or practices that directly bar access to enrollment 
are indirect barriers that can deter and discourage undocumented parents from enrolling 
their children in public early childhood education programs. This subpart describes a 
variety of indirect barriers to access, including onerous application requirements, 
heightened anti-immigration rhetoric, and the increased risk of adverse governmental 
actions aimed at undocumented families.  
Important to note, however, is that Head Start does not directly limit enrollment to 
students lacking documentation. While Congress limited undocumented individuals’ 
access to a variety of public benefits in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),50 it exempted Head Start.51 Local agencies administering 
early childhood education programs relying on funding from the federal Child Care and 
Development Block Grant Program, which funds state programs that administer programs 
pursuant to federal Head Start, are similarly not allowed to deny access on the basis of 
immigration status.52 Nevertheless, the indirect barriers described in this subpart are both 
present and applicable for parents who want to enroll their children in these federally-
funded programs that are administered by state and local actors. 
 The first type of indirect barrier arises from difficult, onerous, and arbitrary 
application requirements.53 The vast majority of state and municipal programs do not 
 
50 8 U.S.C.A §§ 1621, 1622 (West 2000) (The Act created a comprehensive statutory scheme for 
determining aliens’ eligibility for federal, state, and local benefits and services and prevents undocumented 
immigrants from being eligible for federal financial aid or student loans).  
51 James A. Harrell, Clarification of Interpretation of “Federal Public Benefit” Regarding Child Care and 
Development Fund (CCDF) Services, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. ON CHILD., 
YOUTH AND FAMILIES (Nov. 25, 1998), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/occ/pi9808.pdf (in a 
Public Instruction, the Administration for Families and Children explicitly states: “Head Start and Early 
Head Start have been determined not to provide ‘Federal public benefits’ because non-post-secondary 
education benefits were expressly omitted from the statutory definition in title IV of PRWORA. Therefore, 
Head Start providers are not required to implement PRWORA’s verification requirements.”).  
52 See Hannah Matthews, Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Child Care and Early Education Programs, 
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF LAW & SOC. POL’Y (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/public/resources-and-publications/publication-1/Immigrant-
Eligibility-for-ECE-Programs.pdf.  
53 See Gelatt et al., supra note 11, at 16. 
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facially restrict enrollment to immigrants lacking legal immigration status. However, 
municipal and state funded programs tend to require forms of identification that are 
unavailable or difficult to obtain for undocumented parents, even if their children were 
born in the United States. Examples of these types of documentation requirements include 
the parent or guardian’s government issued identification or driver's license, the child’s 
state-issued birth certificate, and the child, parent, or guardian’s social security number.54 
Undocumented parents are by definition ineligible to obtain government-issued 
identification, drivers licenses, or social security numbers. Moreover, undocumented 
parents may face difficulties in accessing their children’s birth certificates either because 
their children were born abroad, or because undocumented parents lack the federally 
approved identification that are sometimes necessary for obtaining their children’s birth 
certificates in this country.55 Even supposedly universal early childhood education 
programs like the one adopted in Oklahoma request documentation in the form of state-
issued birth certificates.56 Additionally because the majority of programs today are means-
tested, many programs require proof-of-income documentation that can be difficult to 
obtain for parents who work in domestic or in other types of nonstandard work 
arrangements.57 Because many undocumented parents are employed in these sorts of work-
arrangements, these requirements can have a disproportionate effect on the children of 
undocumented parents.  
Arkansas’ “Better Chance” program, open to families earning less than 200% of the 
poverty line, exemplifies how these implicit barriers can work. The authorizing legislation 
requires the program to “admit eligible students without regard to race, gender, national 
origin, ancestry, color, disability, creed, political affiliation, or religion.”58 Notably missing 
from this list is immigration status; nevertheless, the program requires parents to provide 
birth certificates as part of its application process.59  
The purpose of requiring these forms of documentation is for programs to verify that 
children meet their programmatic age, state residency, and income requirements—not to 
establish immigration status. While some programs do allow parents to provide alternative 
identification, the mere existence of the documentation requirements can discourage 
parents from enrolling their children in public early childhood education programs.60  
 
54 Pre-K for All: Enroll Now!, IMPACT TULSA, http://www.impacttulsa.org/pre-k-tulsa/frequently-asked-
pre-k-questions/ (last visited July 29, 2019).  
55 Gelatt et al., supra note 11, at 16.  
56 Pre-K for All, supra note 54. Many of these programs, including the one in Oklahoma, do not provide 
much guidance for how parents can circumvent these requirements. 
57 Gelatt et al., supra note 11, at 17 (some programs have developed processes that alleviate these burdens 
on families including by allowing a broad range of documents to serve as proof of income or by allowing 
parents to self-certify their incomes through letters from employers). 
58 RULES GOVERNING THE ARK. BETTER CHANCE PROGRAM 23.04.1 (ARK. DEP’T OF EDUC. 2012).  
59 Id. at 4.06.  
60 See BORKOWSKI, supra note 13, at 23 n.2 (“The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund 
(MALDEF), among other groups, has concluded that Plyler requires that school districts not ‘engage in any 
practices that ‘chill’ or hinder the right of access to school”) (quoting Letter from MALDEF to Dr. Sandra 
Ellis, Superintendent, North Chicago Community Unit Schools (Aug. 9, 2007)), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/north_chicago_school_district.pdf.; see also Gelatt et 
al., supra note 11, at 16−18.   
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These sorts of requirements can deter some parents from enrolling their children in public 
programs for which their children are otherwise eligible.   
A second type of indirect barrier stems from parents’ legitimate fears of facing 
adverse immigration actions, such as deportation, if they enroll their children in these 
public programs. As an example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2017 to amend the “Inadmissibility and Deportability 
on Public Charge Grounds” rule, also known as the public charge rule.61 The public charge 
doctrine is not new. Under the long-standing definition, “a public charge is a person who 
is primarily dependent on the government for subsistence. A person deemed likely to 
become a public charge can be denied admission to the U.S. or the ability to become a 
lawful permanent resident.”62 DHS’s original proposed rule that was leaked to the media63 
attempted to include Head Start as a factor to determine whether a person would be a public 
charge.64 Tacitly, DHS’s original proposal would have treated an undocumented parent’s 
decision to enroll their child in Head Start as an indicator for long-term dependency on the 
state. Neither the updated NPRM nor the final rule included Head Start as a basis to 
determine whether an individual was a public charge .65 Nevertheless, DHS’s attempt to 
include the program raises multiple concerns. First, it shows that the government was 
interested in limiting access to early childhood education on the basis of immigration 
status—that too, legal immigration status. Second, it raises the possibility of such explicit 
barriers to enrollment in the future.  
The growth of overt anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric used by political leaders 
and official policies also deters parents enrolling their children in early childhood 
education. Candidates for public office have run campaigns centered on deporting 
undocumented families. For example, then-gubernatorial candidate Brian Kemp of 
Georgia recorded an official campaign ad during which he stated: “I got a big truck, just in 
case I need to round up criminal illegals and take ’em home myself. Yep, I just said that.”66 
Government officials at the highest levels have also stroked fear amongst immigrant 
 
61 Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, Notice For Proposed Rule [Insert main 
page title here] (2017), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201710&RIN=1615-
AA22 
62 The Trump Administration’s “Public Charge” Attack on Immigrant Families: Information About an 
Upcoming Proposed Rule, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., https://www.nilc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/Public-Charge-Fact-Sheet-2018.pdf (last updated Apr. 12, 2018). 
63 Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Administration May Target Immigrants Who Use Food Aid, Other Benefits, 
(Feb. 8, 2018, 1:19 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-services-exclusive/exclusive-
trump-administration-may-target-immigrants-who-use-food-aid-other-benefits-idUSKBN1FS2ZK. 
64 Dara Lind, Trump’s Draft Plan to Punish Legal Immigrants for Sending US-Born Kids To Head Start, 
(Feb. 8, 2018, 7:37 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/2/8/16993172/trump-regulation-immigrants-benefits-
public-charge. The leaked draft includes the following provision under “§ 212.23: Public benefits 
considered for purposes of public charge inadmissibility: . . . (14) [c]ertain educational benefits, including, 
but not limited to, benefits under the Head Start Act, as amended 42 U.S.C. 9801 et seq.” The leaked 
document is available at: https://cdn.vox-
cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/10188201/DRAFT_NPRM_public_charge.0.pdf.  
65 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 
C.F.R. pts. 103, 212-214, 245, and 248), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/14/2019-
17142/inadmissibility-on-public-charge-grounds. 
66 Ryan Bort, These Georgia Republican Campaign Ads Are Somehow Not Fake, ROLLING STONE (July 20, 
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/brian-kemp-ads-701456/.  
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families in their official capacities. For example, when asked the question of whether 
school officials could report children to ICE before the House Education and Workforce 
Committee, the Secretary of Education responded, “That’s a school decision. It’s a local 
community decision . . . we have laws and we also are compassionate.”67 This sort of 
interpretation of the “laws” cited by the Secretary is faulty68 and dangerous. Since the 2016 
presidential election, federal ICE agents, in their attempts to find and deport undocumented 
individuals, have reportedly targeted early childhood education childcare centers in their 
attempts to arrest undocumented individuals.69 While ICE’s policies fall beyond the scope 
of this paper, its practices incite fear in parents who wish to enroll their children in early 
childhood education programs.70  
The goal of this Note, and primarily the next two parts, is to illustrate how our “laws” 
can be interpreted to protect rather than deter these children’s’ ability to access early 
childhood education programs. In particular, the case of Plyler v. Doe, which is the focus 
of the next Part, provides an avenue through which courts can challenge barriers to entry 
connected to immigration status. The next Part discusses the Supreme Court’s decision, 
and Part III supports the position that early childhood education falls within Plyler’s scope. 
II. THE CASE OF PLYLER V. DOE 
In the case of Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether public 
schools can exclude students based on their immigration status.   
Texas enacted Section 23.031 of the Texas Education Code in 1975,71 which 
permitted public school districts to deny admission and charge tuition to students who were 
 
67 Michael Stratford, DeVos: Schools Should Decide Whether to Report Undocumented Kids, POLITICO, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/22/undocumented-children-schools-devos-immigration-603277 
(last updated May 22, 2018 6:49 PM). 
68 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Fact Sheet: Information on the Rights of All Children 
to Enroll in School, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-factsheet-201101.pdf (last revised 
June, 2012) (“School districts that either prohibit or discourage, or maintain policies that have the effect of 
prohibiting or discouraging, children from enrolling in schools because they or their parents/guardians are 
not U.S. citizens or are undocumented may be in violation of Federal law.”). 
69 See Cervantes et al., supra note 12, at 17 (2018) (In their study on the impacts of immigration policy on 
young children, the authors describe the following: “In nearly all our interview sites, we heard disturbing 
accounts of ICE practices that undermine the best interest of children. In several sites, ICE reportedly 
parked outside schools and child care centers at drop-off or pick-up times and arrested parents on the way 
to drop children off or take them home. ‘ICE can’t go inside the schools, but they can be outside,’ a parent 
in California said, demonstrating the confusion regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s sensitive 
locations policy that restricts ICE and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) from carrying out enforcement 
actions at certain locations—including schools and child care centers. ‘And if they are outside, it’s the same 
thing as being inside, so people say it’s better not to take the kids to school or not go there.’”)  
70 See Matthews et al., supra note 46, at 22.  
71 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1981) (repealed 1995) (current version at TEX. EDUC. CODE 
ANN. § 25.001) ((a) “All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who 
are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day of September of any scholastic 
year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that year. (b) Every child in this state 
who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and 
not over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be 
permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent, 
guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for admission. (c) The 
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not “legally admitted” to the United States.72 Pursuant to the new law, the Tyler 
Independent School District, located in Tyler, Texas, began charging undocumented 
students a $1,000 a year in tuition and began requiring students to produce birth certificates 
for enrollment.73  
A group of Mexican families affected by the policy sought relief in court and 
“complained of [their] exclusion . . . from the public schools of the Tyler Independent 
School District.”74 Each of the plaintiffs’ families had lived in Tyler for at least three years 
prior to the commencement of the case, and at least one had lived in the city for thirteen 
years.75 One scholar noted that one of the plaintiff’s father’s “decision [to file suit] required 
genuine bravery because he felt that doing so substantially increased the risk of deportation 
for him and his family.”76  
Through their class action, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the Southern 
District of Texas on the basis that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) preempted 
the contested Texas statute and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.77 Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, Judge William Wayne Justice ruled the Texas statute could 
not withstand a minimal rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.78 The 
district court held that the defendants’ argument that educating undocumented children 
would be impermissibly burdensome to the state did not constitute  a rational basis for the 
law or policy of excluding children who lacked legal status.79 The district court also held 
 
board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the public free schools of the 
district free of tuition all persons who are either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and 
who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his 
parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.”).  
72 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (The statute allowed districts to “deny enrollment in their public 
schools to children not ‘legally admitted’ to the country.”). 
73 Catherine Winter, ‘All They Wanted To Do Was Get An Education,’ APM REP. (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.apmreports.org/story/2017/05/30/all-they-wanted-to-do-was-get-an-education; Jamie 
Williams, Children Versus Texas: The Legacy of Plyler v. Doe 4 (Apr. 2011), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Children_v._Texas_Williams.pdf.   
74 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 206.  
75 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Tex. 1978). See Barbara Belejack, A Lesson in Equal 
Protection, TEX. OBSERVER (July 13, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/2548-a-lesson-in-
equal-protection-the-texas-cases-that-opened-the-schoolhouse-door-to-undocumented-immigrant-children/; 
Paul Feldman, Texas Case Looms Over Prop. 187’s Legal Future, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1994), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-10-23/news/mn-53869_1_illegal- immigrants; Katherine Leal Unmuth, 
Tyler Case Opened Schools to Illegal Migrants, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 14, 2007), 
http://shapleigh.org/news/1328-tyler-caseopened-schools-to-illegal-migrants; Mary Ann Zehr, Case 
Touched Many Parts of Community, EDUC. WK. (June 6, 2007), 
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/06/06/39plylerside.h26.html (subscription required to access). 
76 JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE, PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE 
FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 350 (Pantheon Books eds. 2018). Because of the risk of deportation, the four 
families who were part of the original suit filed the case under pseudonym.  
77 OLIVAS, supra note 2, at 17–20.  
78 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 580 (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 93 S. 
Ct. 1278 (1973)) (In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right and failed 
to apply strict scrutiny review in assessing the constitutionality of a Texas school-financing system under 
the equal protection clause).  
79 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 585.  
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that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all persons, regardless of citizenship.80 Judge 
Justice worried that if the Texas statute were to stand, it would disallow the children from 
entering public schools and could cause them to “become permanently locked into the 
lowest socioeconomic class,”81 mirroring the Supreme Court’s concerns in Brown v. Board 
of Education.82 He also held that federal law preempted the Texas statute, given the clear 
dominance of federal government in the field of immigration.83 Judge Justice struck down 
Section 21.031 only as it pertained to Tyler’s school district,84 and the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the ruling in part on appeal.85  
The district court’s ruling in this original Plyler case inspired seventeen other 
challenges to the legality of Section 21.031 across the state. The Southern District of Texas 
consolidated these cases into In re Alien Children Education Litigation.86 In this second 
wave of litigation, the district court similarly held that Section 21.031 violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and went as far as to say that “the absolute deprivation of education 
should trigger strict judicial scrutiny, particularly when the absolute deprivation is the 
result of complete inability to pay for the desired benefit.”87 As such, the court applied 
strict scrutiny and held that the challenged law did not substantially relate to any 
compelling state interest.88 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, and the defendants 
subsequently appealed the decision.89   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, consolidated both appeals, and issued a final 
opinion on June 15, 1982.90 Justice Brennan first held that the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment reaches undocumented immigrants on the reasoning that a 
state’s jurisdiction reaches all “persons” within its jurisdiction.91 He carefully relied on the 
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment and wrote that “citizens or strangers, 
within this land, shall have equal protection in every state in this union in the rights and 
liberty and property.”92  
Then, the Court decided on which analytic framework under the Equal Protection 
Clause —rational basis review, strict scrutiny, or something in the middle—would be 
appropriate for the set of facts underlying this case. The level of scrutiny informs the 
 
80 Id. at 579.  
81 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 208 (1982) (citing Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 577). 
82 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  
83 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 592.   
84 Id. at 593.  
85 The Fifth Circuit disagreed that Section 21.031 was preempted by federal law. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 
448, 450 (5th Cir. 1980).  
86 501 F. Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
87 In re Alien Children Ed. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1980).  
88 Id. at 583. 
89 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).  
90 See id. at 202.  
91 Id. at 210, 215 (citing the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brennan wrote that “[n]o State shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Court held that “within its jurisdiction … confirms, 
the understanding that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, 
who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State’s territory. That a person’s 
initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be 
expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State’s territorial perimeter.”).  
92 Id. at 214 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033 (1866)). 
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Court’s determination of whether a challenged law or policy is sufficiently tailored to a 
state interest and how important that interest is to the state.  
In this case, the Plyler Court chose not to apply strict scrutiny for two reasons.  
First, the Court found that “illegal aliens” do not constitute a “suspect class” 
because “their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a “constitutional 
irrelevancy” and because their entry into the class was “a product of voluntary action.”93 
However, Justice Brennan focused on the unique characteristics of the plaintiff children 
who were injured by Section 21.031 to extend them a “quasi-suspect" status of sorts.94 To 
this end, Justice Brennan wrote:  
“Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its 
beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the 
product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply with 
the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children 
of such illegal entrants.”95  
The children lacked authority over their own circumstances, which set them apart 
from adults who arguably have more agency over the decision to migrate to the United 
States without documentation. The majority noted that penalizing children for the decisions 
of their parents had no rational justification and could not “comport with fundamental 
conceptions of justice.”96 Likewise, in his powerful concurrence, Justice Powell 
emphasized that children are innocent, citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., where 
the Supreme Court had held that penalizing children “for the misdeeds of the parents is 
illogical, unjust, and ‘contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should 
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.’”97 
Second, the Court relied on its previous ruling in Rodriguez that education does not 
constitute a “fundamental right,” which would have triggered strict scrutiny. However, 
Justice Brennan acknowledged that public education is not “merely some government 
‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation”98 and wrote that 
“education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”99 Harkening 
to its ruling in Brown, the Court stressed that the ability for children to avail themselves of 
a public education was too important in terms of their ability to become full participants in 
our society.100 Thus, the majority appeared to treat public education as a sort of quasi-
fundamental right.101  
As a result, while the Court acted as it was applying ordinary rational basis review, 
it applied a heightened form of rational basis review, much akin to the intermediate scrutiny 
 
93 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216, 219, n. 19.  
94 Id. at 244.  
95 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 219–20. 
96 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 220.  
97 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).  
98 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 221.  
99 Id. at 244.   
100 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.").  
101 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 221. 
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framework that the Court had begun to use when assessing gender-based classifications.102  
Justice Brennan wrote, “[i]f the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the 
free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial 
must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.”103 
 Justice Brennan struggled to identify how Section 21.031 served any such 
substantial state interest.104 In its defense, the State of Texas offered several justifications 
for the statute. Importantly, these arguments continue to underlie the contemporary 
immigration debate in 2019. First, Texas argued that allowing undocumented children to 
attend public schools would amount to tacitly condoning illegal immigration.105 The Court 
was “reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to withhold from these children … 
access to a basic education.”106 Second, Texas argued that undocumented children placed 
“special burdens” on the its ability to provide quality education to its remaining students.107 
Texas could not provide any conclusive evidence that offering education to this group of 
children affected incentivized further undocumented immigration nor that these children 
posed significant economic burdens on the state.108 Third, Texas argued undocumented 
children were less likely to remain within the state after graduation because of their lawful 
status. The Court also rejected this argument as well on the basis that this risk was present 
with any child. On the whole, the majority was unconvinced that depriving children of a 
public education met any substantial state interest and concluded that Texas’s arguments 
lacked sufficient supporting evidence. The Court reasoned that the costs associated with 
educating these children outweighed any immigration-related costs that Texas allegedly 
purported to be saving.109  
Because of the majority’s ruling, children lacking legal documentation have been 
given the opportunity to gain a public school education.110 The legacy of Plyler is evident 
today: public school districts may not bar undocumented children from admission to 
elementary or secondary schools; it “stands for the abolition of castes and an affirmation 
of equality—two precepts which should be bedrock principles of the critical democratic 
 
102 See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Contra Steven G. Calabresi & Lena M. Barksy, An 
Originalist Defense of Plyler v. Doe, 2017 BYU L. REV. 225, 227–28 (2017) (“The Court essentially 
followed a Lochnerian approach to the Fourteenth Amendment even though it used the post-New Deal 
rational basis test and the concept of ‘strict scrutiny.’”). 
103 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 230.  
104 Id. at 244.   
105 Id. at 228.  
106 Id. at 225.  
107 Id. at 229.  
108 Id. at 228 (“To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public 
services, while contributing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state.”).   
109  Id. at 222 (“The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education 
each and every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social economic, intellectual, 
and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it 
most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the 
framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.”).  
110 DRIVER, supra note 76 (While not popularly known outside the realm of the legal academy, Justin 
Driver writes that “Properly understood, [Plyler] rests among the most egalitarian, momentous, and 
efficacious constitutional opinions that the Supreme Court has issued throughout its entire history.”).  
 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY   [2019 
 
 114
moment in which we live.”111 Public schools may not even inquire as to these students’ 
immigration status.112 The following Part explains how the Court’s reasoning in the case 
supports the position that public early childhood education programs fall within the realm 
of Plyler’s protections.  
III. PLYLER REACHES EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION 
This Part describes how the Supreme Court’s language, arguments, and general spirit 
support the position that Plyler’s protections extend to public early childhood education 
today.  
A. Early Childhood Education is Integral to a Comprehensive Public Education 
Following the Supreme Court’s analytical approach in Brown, this Note considers 
the current state of public education to assess whether Plyler does indeed apply in context 
of public early childhood education. In Brown, the Court looked at the state of public 
education in 1954, when the case was heard, instead of at the time of the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in reaching its ultimate conclusion that “separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.”113 Under this analytical framework, early childhood 
education is an integral part of a comprehensive public education today.114 
Factors on the supply and demand sides of the equation support this position. As 
discussed in Part I, cities, states, and the federal government are much more significant 
providers of early childhood education today than in 1982.115 A larger share of families are 
seeking to enroll their children in public early childhood education programs than in 1965, 
when President Johnson launched Head Start, or when the Plyler case was decided in 1982. 
Fewer than ten percent of students were enrolled in public early childhood education 
programs in 1980.116 From 1980 to 2017, the percentage of children between the ages of 
three and five children enrolled in public early childhood programs quadrupled, rising to 
almost forty percent.117   
As more parents are enrolling their children in public programs and as states and 
municipalities open additional classroom seats, early childhood education is becoming 
more widely recognized as a public good akin to traditional K-12 public education. 
 
111 María Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond 
Plyler v. Doe, SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2005); Catherine E. Lhamon et al., Dear Colleague Letter: 
School Enrollment Procedures, Plyler, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC. 1 (May 8, 2014), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201405.pdf.  
112 Lhamon et al., supra note 111.   
113 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Even in the North, the conditions of public 
education did not approximate those existing today . . . [I]t is not surprising that there should be so little in 
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.”). 
114 See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the 
Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1476 (2007) (Professor Michael Rebell makes the argument that early 
childhood education programs are a component of a right to “comprehensive educational equity.”); Ryan, 
supra note 18, at 77 (arguing that “[a] strong legal case, therefore, can be made for including universal 
preschool in any definition of the right to an adequate education.”). 
115 See also supra Part (I)(A). 
116 Phillips et al., supra note 31, at 6.  
117 Id. 
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Enrollment in early childhood education has become essential for students to achieve many 
of the core purposes of public education.118 In Brown, the Supreme Court emphasized 
several characteristics of public education, including that “it is required in the performance 
of our most basic responsibilities … it is the foundation of good citizenship … a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values … in preparing him for later 
professional training … [and] in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”119 
The Plyler court itself emphasized the importance of the role of a basic education in 
teaching students how to read and write and becoming self-sufficient in our society.120 
These goals are not dissimilar from the goals of early childhood education programs today. 
Professor James Ryan, a leading expert on law and education, writes:  
“[A]s more children enroll in publicly funded pre-K programs, it may 
become harder for states to say that pre-K is not part of their public 
education systems. At a certain point, suggesting that only some students 
are entitled to pre-K could be akin to saying that only some students can 
attend Kindergarten – or third grade.”121 
Moreover, there is widespread popular support for public investments in early 
childhood education today.122 A 2017 national poll of bipartisan voters revealed that 
eighty-nine percent of voters support “making early childhood education and child care 
more affordable for working families” for children from birth through age five.123 
Conservative and liberal lawmakers from both ends of the ideological spectrum have 
included expansions of public early childhood education programs in their policy 
platforms.124 The public embrace of investing in public early childhood education is 
partially due to the sympathetic character of the intended beneficiaries of these 
investments: young children under the age of five. Educating young children remains 
politically and socially palatable in this era of partisanship. As such, arguments for 
supporting these investments mirror those made for the expansion of kindergarten a 
hundred years ago.125 
B. Young Children Fall within Plyler’s Scope 
The population of focus in this Note, namely children between the ages of three and 
five lacking documentation are similar to the plaintiffs in Plyler. This group of children 
has little to no control on the immigration decisions of their parents or on their 
 
118 See supra Part(I)(A). 
119 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  
120 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).  
121 James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Pre-K?, EDUC. WK. (Mar. 9, 2016, 6:52 AM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/making_ the_case/2016/03/a_constitutional_right_to_pre-k.html.  
122 See ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 2.  
123 2017 National Poll, FIRST FIVE YEARS FUND (2018), https://www.ffyf.org/2017-poll/.   
124 See Alia Wong, The Bipartisan Appeal of Pre-K, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/pre-k-vs-college/412048/ (citing a 2015 survey 
conducted by the First Five Years Fund which indicated that a plurality of parents polled supported greater 
investments in early education compared to higher education). 
125 Ryan, supra note 18, at 51, 72.  
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circumstances in the United States. Their realities are shaped entirely by the decisions of 
their parents. Therefore, a central concern of the Plyler majority is relevant and appropriate 
in this context: depriving children of early childhood education penalizes them for the 
decisions of their parents and does not “comport with fundamental conceptions of 
justice.”126  
Furthermore, early childhood education is much more similar to K-12 education than 
post-secondary education. The courts’ refusal to extend Plyler to post-secondary 
education,127  despite the urging of scholars in the area,128 based of its differences from K-
12 education in fact further supports the applicability of Plyler to early childhood 
education. In Regents of University of California v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, for 
example, the court failed to extend Plyler’s heightened scrutiny to post-secondary 
education, arguing that “[t]here is, of course, a significant difference between an 
elementary education and a university education.”129 This difference, namely centers on 
the purpose of primary—and early education—to ensure that our children will be able to 
contribute to civic institutions and to the betterment of our nation from a fundamental 
sense.130 Furthermore, “no court appears to have adopted [the] view … [that] higher 
education currently plays the same socioeconomic role that primary and secondary 
education played in the 1970s and 1980s.”131  
Moreover, numerous states have enacted laws or policies that limit access to public 
post-secondary education, to in-state tuition, and financial aid in various ways.132 Congress 
enacted PWRORA to limit “state and local public benefits” to undocumented immigrants 
who are “not lawfully present in the United States” unless states pass legislation that 
“affirmatively provides” for their eligibility in the benefit programs.133 As a result, 
undocumented students are ineligible for in-state tuition to public post-secondary 
institutions unless a state statute explicitly provides for such benefit.134 Additionally, 
 
126 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). This Note cautions against interpretations of this reasoning that 
place judgment on the decisions of undocumented adults. Undocumented immigrants have a diversity of 
experiences, stories, and reasons for their arrival to the United States. A broader discussion of immigration 
trends and policies in the United States is beyond the scope of this Note. 
127 Regents of U. of California v. Super. Ct., 276 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1990); see also Kate M. 
Manuel, Unauthorized Aliens, Higher Education, In-State Tuition, and Financial Aid: Legal Analysis, 
CONGR. RES. SERV. 1, 9 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43447.pdf  (“[N]o court appears to have 
adopted [the] view … [that] higher education currently plays the same socioeconomic role that primary and 
secondary education played in the 1970s and 1980s.”).   
128 See, e.g., Laura A. Hernández, Dreams Deferred: Why In-State College Tuition Rates Are Not a Benefit 
under the IIRIRA and How This Interpretation Violates the Spirit of Plyler, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
525, 536 (2012) (“Post-secondary education is as vital and important for advancement in American society 
today as secondary education was in 1977 and 1982.”). 
129 Regents of U. California, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 202. 
130 Id.  
131 Manuel, supra note 127. 
132 Kristina Rogan, Defining Residency: In-State Tuition Implications for United States Citizens Who Are 
Children of Undocumented Immigrant Parents, SETON HALL LEG. J. 177, 190–91 (2017), 
https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1112&context=shlj.  
133 8 U.S.C. §1611(c)(1) (federal public benefits); 8 U.S.C. §1621(c)(1) (state and local public benefits).  
134 Rogan, supra note 132, at 184.  
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Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)135 that 
effectively prohibits states from offering in-state tuition to students lacking legal 
immigration status.136 There are no such federal laws barring access to early childhood 
education today; although, as discussed in Part I,137 the lack of these sorts of barriers does 
not mean that future barriers will not be erected.   
C. The Plyler’s Court’s Silence on Early Childhood Education 
In Plyler, the Supreme Court did not explicitly limit the definition of public education 
to exclude early childhood education. Rather, it was facially agnostic to whether early 
childhood education can be considered  “public education;” the Court only speaks about 
the impermissibility of denying access to “public education” in a broad sense.138 Justice 
Brennan refers to “elementary education”139 only once in passing and Justice Powell 
discusses only “school-age children.”140 Otherwise, the opinions only include the terms of 
“basic education” and “public education.”141 The plaintiffs at bar were elementary school-
aged children; the question of early childhood education was not at bar in a literal sense. 
The common conception of public education at the time of the Plyler decision, as argued 
above, likely did not include early childhood education .142  
Nothing in the text prevents Plyler from applying to preschool; to the contrary, 
Michael Olivas, a law professor and expert on Plyler, has said that if litigated, Plyler could 
offer protections to preschool aged children.143 New York Times Supreme Court reporter 
Linda Greenhouse argues for a narrow interpretation of the opinion that applies only to the 
realm of education; she writes, “[Justice] Powell wanted the case to be about the education 
of children, not the equal protection of rights of immigrants, and so the decision was.”144  
Part of this goes to the majority’s argument regarding the “unique circumstances” 
surrounding a basic education, namely the characteristics and purposes of a basic 
 
135 8 U.S.C.A § 1623 (West 2000). The statute provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an 
alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a 
State (or a political subdivision) for any postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the 
United States is eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope) without regard to 
whether the citizen or national is such a resident.”  
136 The impact of the IIRIRA on states’ ability to charge in-state tuition for undocumented students has not 
been clear. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 864–65 (Cal. 2010) (finding a 
California law that permitted undocumented students who have attended at least three years of high school 
and have graduated to pay in-state tuition to public post-secondary institutions to be consistent with Section 
505 of the IIRIRA).  
137 See supra Part (I)(B).  
138 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S 202, 230 (1982). In Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 575, the court explicitly 
discusses that two students were previously enrolled in Head Start but it makes no further comment about 
the applicability of Plyler to such early childhood education programs.  
139 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 226. 
140 Id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring).  
141 See generally id. 
142 See supra Part III(A)-(B).  
143 Samuels, supra note 12.  
144 Jill Lepore, Is Education a Fundamental Right?, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/10/is-education-a-fundamental-right.  
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education.145 This Note’s argument does not exceed even this more narrow reading of the 
Court’s opinion.  
Because early childhood education has become a core component of the modern 
public education system and because it closely aligns with the purposes of a basic education 
as contemplated in Plyler itself, the Supreme Court’s reasoning can be interpreted to also 
protect children seeking to attend public early childhood education programs.  
IV. USING PLYLER TO ENSURE ACCESS TO EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION PROGRAMS 
As Part III asserts, Plyler offers an avenue for courts to protect their ability for 
undocumented children and children of undocumented parents to access public early 
childhood education programs. This Part discusses how families, advocates, and policy 
makers can utilize the interpretation of Plyler offered in this Note to ensure that 
undocumented children, and children of undocumented parents, are able to enroll in public 
early childhood education programs—both inside and outside of the courtroom.  
A. Inside the Courtroom 
Undocumented children and the children of undocumented parents can utilize Plyler 
in future direct litigation challenging direct and indirect barriers to early childhood 
education programs on the basis of immigration status. If children and families decide to 
litigate the constitutionality of these barriers to access, they may be able to rely on the 
broad reading of Plyler as articulated in Part III that encompasses early childhood 
education. In this way, Plyler can be an incredibly useful precedent for claims under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Immigration policies and the 
interpretation of immigration laws have been rapidly changing over the last few years. 
There is no evidence that Indiana’s pilot program will be the last attempt to restrict access 
to public early childhood programs. Cities and states may very well create their own early 
childhood programs that attempt to exclude students based on their immigration status in 
the future. Programs may also continue to have onerous identification requirements that 
deter parents from sending their children to early childhood education programs.146 Plyler 
can be useful in challenging these kinds of barriers in court.  
 Practically, however, litigating the question of whether Plyler applies to early 
childhood education will likely be difficult. To date, there is no case that directly address 
this central question. If advocates and/or organizational advocates want to litigate this 
 
145 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court failed to extend Plyler’s application of 
intermediate scrutiny in a case where the plaintiffs alleged that a public school district’s policy of charging 
a user fee for bus transportation violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Kadrmas v. 
Dickinson Public School, 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988). The Supreme Court emphasized that it has not 
extended Plyler’s holding beyond the “unique circumstances” of primary and secondary education. Id. 
Contra Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty, R.I. v. New York, 224 F.R.D. 314, 321, (E.D.N.Y. 
2004) (where the court argued that the children of homeless parents were not receiving an equal access to 
public education, and as such, the county’s policy “penalize[ed] these homeless children because of the 
misfortunes or misdeeds of their parents;” the court applies the heightened scrutiny as established in Plyler 
based on the importance of education and held that the county’s transportation policy was in violation of 
the 14th Amendment).   
146 See supra Part I(B). 
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issue, they will need to find a plaintiff, or class of plaintiffs, who (1) was denied access to 
an early childhood education program on the basis of immigration status; (2) who would 
be willing to undertake the burden of litigation with no real likelihood of receiving a 
remedy for their own child; and (3) is willing to risk potential deportation or other adverse 
immigration actions during the course of litigation.147  
However, advocates and policy makers can look to executive action as an alternative 
means for legal change. For example, the Departments of Education and Justice issued a 
joint “Dear Colleague” letter in 2014 that instructed state and local educational agencies to 
“become aware of student enrollment practices that may chill or discourage the 
participation, or lead to the exclusion, of students based on their or their parents’ or 
guardians’ actual or perceived citizenship or immigration status.”148 The letter cites directly 
to Plyler and instructs schools to only inquire into parents’ residency for the purpose of 
establishing residency in a district and not the country.149 This letter is still in effect but 
only pertains to K-12 schools. Plyler can and should be interpreted at the agency level in a 
way that applies this policy statement to public early childhood education programs.150 
This form of executive directive does invoke the power of the law to directly control 
behavior but also makes a statement about our country’s values regarding education of 
undocumented children. 
 
147 Given these possible immigration consequences from undocumented immigrants bringing suit, it is 
important for these plaintiffs to discuss with legal counsel what the risks are and how to navigate those 
risks. As an alternative, immigrant-focused organizations may be able to assert direct organizational 
standing to litigate this issue, pursuant to Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), if it can 
establish a cognizable organization injury stemming from either (A) a diversion of organizational resources 
to identify or counteract the allegedly unlawful action, or (B) frustration of the organization’s mission. The 
complexities surrounding organizational standing, however, is largely beyond the scope of this Note.   
148 Lhamon et al., supra note 111. 
149 See id. at 2.   
150 Id. Notwithstanding these options, states and municipalities may need to act in absence of a recognition 
of a fundamental right to education at the federal level. Several scholars place these arguments in their 
attempts to create a universal substantive right to pre-school education or education more broadly stated. 
See generally Ryan, supra note 18. While such a goal is admirable from a theoretical sense, such a creation 
of a right is impractical given the constitution of the Supreme Court today. If the Court was to create a 
substantive right to preschool education, there would be greater protection for undocumented children. 
However, waiting for the creation of the right to education, which has never been recognized by the Court, 
may be a futile effort. More importantly, the creation of such a right is unnecessary for the narrow purpose 
presented within this Note. Some states have already made preschool education a Constitutional 
requirement without regard to immigration status. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(b) states: “Every four-year old 
child in Florida shall be provided by the State a high-quality pre-kindergarten learning opportunity in the 
form of an early childhood development and education program which shall be voluntary, high quality, 
free, and delivered according to professionally accepted standards. An early childhood development and 
education program means an organized program designed to address and enhance each child’s ability to 
make age appropriate progress in an appropriate range of settings in the development of language and 
cognitive capabilities and emotional, social, regulatory and moral capacities through education in basic 
skills and such other skills as the Legislature may determine to be appropriate.” After a state referendum in 
2002, Florida adopted language in its state Constitution that requires the state to provide preschool 
education to all four-year old children living in Florida. The New Jersey Supreme Court came just short of 
creating such a “right” to preschool education; however, in Abbott v. Burke, the court ordered the state to 
provide high quality preschool education to all children living in high-poverty urban districts pursuant to 
their state constitutional duty to provide a “thorough and efficient education.” 710 A.2d 450, 464 (1998). 
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B. Outside the Courtroom: Leveraging Plyler’s Expressive Value 
The Supreme Court’s failure to foreclose the applicability of Plyler to the context of 
early childhood education can be a powerful tool for advocacy today. The existence of 
helpful Supreme Court precedent can be useful for facilitating social change and changes 
in the perceptions of undocumented families living in the United States. Prolific legal 
scholar, Cass Sunstein, has written on the “expressive function of law,” writing that the 
law has a second function apart from controlling behavior to “make statements.” He writes 
that through this function, laws can “change social norms.”151 Here, the interpretation of 
Plyler posited by this Note has the potential to send a signal to state and local governments 
that they should not enact or support policies that directly or indirectly deter parents from 
enrolling their children in public early education programs. Further, the existence of 
favorable case law can influence policy makers to take preventive steps that reduce the 
likelihood that they restrict educational opportunities for these children in the future.   
Immigration reform in a way that would improve the quality of life for families 
lacking legal documentation in the United States seems elusive today. Federal courts are 
hesitant to extend new substantive rights, such as a fundamental right to education, and 
Congress is unlikely to legislate to statutorily extend a right to education for these children. 
Given this backdrop, Plyler provides an avenue through which families and advocates can 
rely on already good law to afford a critical opportunity to an entire generation of children.  
CONCLUSION 
Early childhood education has become a central component of American public 
education. Given the importance of early childhood education on students’ ability to 
succeed in later school years and life, cities, states, and the federal government are all 
investing in public early childhood education programs that serve students between the 
ages of three and five. But as enrollment in these programs has grown, undocumented 
children are increasingly facing direct and indirect barriers that limit their ability to enroll 
in these public programs—and are, as a result, being deprived of a comprehensive public 
education.   
The Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe offers a means through which these 
children, their families, and advocates can challenge direct and indirect barriers to access. 
As this Note makes evident, early childhood education programs that serve children under 
the age of five fit squarely within the Plyler’s protection. In this era of judicial restraint, 
heightened xenophobia, and disagreement over the future of immigration policy, Plyler 
offers hope for advocates, families, and policymakers who want to ensure that all children 
can receive a truly comprehensive public education.  
 
151 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25 (1996). 
